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
Report No. DODIG-2014-053



# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

April 4, 2014



## (U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan

Classified By: Michael J. Roark,  
Deputy Assistant Inspector General Readiness and  
Cyber Operations

Derived From: Multiple Sources

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## Results in Brief

### *(U//FOUO) U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan*

April 4, 2014

#### **(U) What We Did**

(U) We determined whether DoD has effective controls over the storing and handling of equipment staged for shipment at Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) in Afghanistan. This is one in a series of audits regarding U.S. Transportation Command's support of the Afghanistan drawdown.

#### **(U) What We Found**

(U) DoD did not have effective controls over the storing and handling of retrograde equipment at APODs in Afghanistan. U.S. Transportation Command contracting officials did not establish effective security and oversight requirements to safeguard cargo staged for shipment at APODs in Afghanistan. This occurred because contracting officials omitted specific security requirements, did not include effective monitoring and surveillance requirements, and did not appoint any oversight officials in Afghanistan. As a result, DoD has no assurance that contractors are properly securing cargo at Bagram Airfield (BAF) and Kandahar Airfield (KAF) APODs. Without stronger contract oversight, there is increased risk that equipment could be lost, damaged, or vandalized in transit.

(U) In addition, the 451<sup>st</sup> Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron and 455<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Aerial Port Squadron did not properly secure or handle cargo staged for shipment at KAF and BAF aerial ports, respectively, which left highly sensitive cargo at risk of being lost, damaged, or falling into the hands of our enemies.

(U) Furthermore, we observed poorly palletized cargo arriving at the BAF aerial port from closing Forward Operating Bases, which the 455<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Aerial Port Squadron must fix before shipment. Improperly packaged cargo negatively impacted aerial port operations and caused a backlog. We made numerous suggestions to both squadrons to resolve these problems. Each squadron immediately acted on our suggestions and resolved the security concerns. We commend each squadron's efforts to resolve the issues identified.

#### **(U) What We Recommend**

(U) Among other recommendations, we recommend that the contracting officer: modify the multi-modal contract to define security and handling requirements and determine the number and location of Contracting Officer Representatives necessary to provide adequate contract oversight in Afghanistan. In addition, we recommend the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command create and implement standard operating procedures to ensure the proper securing and handling of equipment.

#### **(U) Management Comments and Our Response**

(U) Management comments from the Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, partially addressed recommendation A.1.a. Therefore, we request the contracting officer, U.S. Transportation Command, provide revised comments to the final report by May 5, 2014. Please see the recommendations table on the back of this page.

***(U) Recommendations Table***

(U) Management	(U) Recommendations Requiring Comment	(U) No Additional Comments Required
(U) Contracting Officer, U.S. Transportation Command	(U) A.1.a	(U) A.1.b, A.1.c
(U) Global Contract Compliance Branch Chief, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command		(U) A.2

(U) Please provide comments by May 5, 2014.



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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

(U) April 4, 2014

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
COMMANDER, SURFACE DEPLOYMENT AND  
DISTRIBUTION COMMAND

(U) SUBJECT: U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the  
Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan  
(Report No. DODIG-2014-053)

(U) We are providing this report for your review and comment. The U.S. Transportation Command did not have effective oversight procedures for the shipment of equipment from Bagram and Kandahar Airfields under the Multi-Modal contract. This is one in a series of audits regarding the U.S. Transportation Command's support of the Afghanistan drawdown. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command fully addressed Recommendations A.1b, A.1.c, and A.2; however, comments on Recommendation A.1.a partially addressed the recommendation. Therefore, we request additional comments from the contracting officer, U.S. Transportation Command, by May 5, 2014.

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments to DoD OIG: (b) (6) Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-8905 (DSN 664-8905).

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Amy J. Frantz", is positioned above the typed name.

Amy J. Frantz  
Principal Assistant Inspector General  
for Auditing

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## (U) Introduction

### (U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether DoD has effective controls over the storing and handling of equipment staged for shipment at Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) in Afghanistan. See Appendix A for the scope and methodology and Appendix B for prior audit coverage related to the objective.

### (U) Background

(U) This is one in a series of audits regarding U.S. Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) support of the Afghanistan drawdown. For this audit, we included all equipment and material redeploying through the APODs. An APOD is an airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel, to serve as an authorized port for entrance into or departure from the country in which the airfield is located. Afghanistan has three primary APODs—Bagram Airfield (BAF), Kandahar Airfield (KAF), and Camp Bastion. Redeploying U.S. military equipment will flow through these APODs as it leaves Afghanistan via a spoke-and-hub system,<sup>1</sup> about 40 percent each through BAF and KAF with the remaining 20 percent through Camp Bastion.

### (U) Retrograde

(U) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," November 8, 2010 (as amended through March 15, 2013), defines "retrograde" as "the process for the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset (replenishment, repair, or recapitalization) program or to another directed area of operations to replenish unit stocks, or to satisfy stock requirements."

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) TRANSCOM (b)(1) sec. 1-4(b)

[REDACTED]

<sup>1</sup> (U) A spoke-and-hub system is a system in which smaller tactical aircraft (for example, C-130) deliver smaller cargo loads from supported FOBs (spokes) to offload at larger hubs, such as BAF or KAF.

<sup>2</sup> (U) Rolling stock includes wheeled vehicles, tracked combat vehicles, wheeled/tracked construction equipment, trailers, semi-trailers, and any other standard trailer-mounted equipment. Nonrolling stock encompasses all other equipment that is not rolling stock.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [REDACTED] TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Figure 1. [REDACTED] TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]



(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Source: DoD OIG

(S//NF) [REDACTED] TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>3</sup> (U) A "short ton" (2,000 pounds) is a term different from a "metric ton" (2,240 pounds).

<sup>4</sup> (S//NF) As of August 2013, [REDACTED] TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)



(U) The cargo from these aerial ports account for about 20 percent of retrograde equipment. Once entered into the Defense Transportation System, retrograde cargo is eligible for airlift via U.S. Air Force aerial ports or the Army Movement Control Team. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) moves the remaining 80 percent of retrograde cargo.

### ***(U) Command Structure***

(U) U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was established in January 1983, with an area of responsibility that includes Afghanistan. CENTCOM designated U.S. Forces-Afghanistan as the supported command for theater retrograde operations.

(U) U.S. Air Force Central Command is responsible for air operations for Southwest Asia. The 455<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Aerial Port Squadron (EAPS), located at BAF, and the 451<sup>st</sup> Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron (ELRS), located at KAF, perform equipment movement functions, such as conducting joint inspections and ensuring airworthiness of cargo. Both squadrons provide support for the storing and handling of equipment staged for shipment at BAF and KAF APODs.

(U) Established in 1987, TRANSCOM is the single manager of the U.S. global Defense Transportation System. TRANSCOM coordinates people and transportation assets to allow the United States to project and sustain forces, when and where they are needed, for as long as necessary. TRANSCOM coordinates missions worldwide using both military and commercial sea, air, and land transportation assets in response to DoD's warfighting commanders' needs across the full spectrum of support, ranging from humanitarian operations to military contingencies.

(U) SDDC is the Army Service Component Command of the TRANSCOM. SDDC manages and coordinates all surface moves in support of door-to-door container and break bulk cargo movements around the world. SDDC is responsible for executing the logistical drawdown of U.S. forces and equipment in Afghanistan. In FY 2012, SDDC facilitated the redeployment of more than 3.3 million square feet of unit cargo and more than 4.4 million square feet of retrograde cargo via 830 vessels.

(U) SDDC has five major subordinate brigades, including the 595<sup>th</sup> Transportation Brigade (595<sup>th</sup>) at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, which provides surface deployment command, control, and distribution operations to meet national security objectives in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The 595<sup>th</sup> supports the deployment and redeployment of unit cargo. The 831<sup>st</sup> Transportation Battalion (831<sup>st</sup>) is the forward-deployed unit of the 595<sup>th</sup> responsible for Operation Enduring Freedom. The 831<sup>st</sup> battalion headquarters are in Bahrain, with detachments stationed in Qatar,



(U) Bagram, and Kandahar, as well as deployment and distribution support teams engaged throughout Afghanistan.

## **(U) Structure of the Multi-Modal Contract**

(U) Afghanistan is a mountainous, landlocked country with extremely poor road conditions and minimal infrastructure. This terrain, along with weather and security issues, poses a complicated set of logistical challenges. As a result, much of the equipment, especially weapons systems and combat vehicles, must depart Afghanistan by air, at least for the first leg. This type of cargo movement requires, multi-modal (MM) transport, which requires an initial air movement from one country and then a transfer to another conveyance, typically a ship, for the rest of the trip. MM transport provides a middle-ground option between the speed of air direct and the lower cost of surface movement.

(U) TRANSCOM awarded MM contract HTC711-1X-D-R00X to allow for the commercial transport of equipment from Afghanistan. This Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract, with a 1-year base period and two option years, started in August 2012. TRANSCOM intended for this contract to allow the contractor to elect the most efficient type or mix of transportation methods (air, sea, rail, truck, barge); to minimize military involvement in the shipment of goods and equipment to and from Afghanistan; and to provide a viable alternative to the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication and Northern Distribution Network surface routes. The contract permitted five prime contractors to bid on individual task orders when cargo was available for transport. The majority of retrograde cargo transiting via MM transport is rolling stock.

(U) The TRANSCOM-Acquisition Office solicits the cargo shipment among a five-contractor awardee pool. SDDC then books the cargo shipment after TRANSCOM-Acquisition Office awards the shipment to a contractor. The contractor is then responsible for each piece of cargo from the time of acceptance at the RPAT yard until each piece of cargo reaches its final destination.<sup>5</sup> In most cases, the contractors make every attempt to accept cargo, transport it to the aerial port, and load the cargo onto a commercial flight on the same day; however, in many instances, doing so is not possible. Consequently, the contractor must stage equipment on the APOD overnight (or longer) until a commercial flight is scheduled (Figure 2). For example, SDDC records indicated that contractors staged cargo, including military vehicles and CIIs, at either BAF or KAF APODs for at least 1 night on all 19 cargo shipments picked up in May 2013.

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<sup>5</sup> (U) The contract carriers subcontract the movement of retrograde equipment from the RPAT yards to the flight line to companies permanently located at BAF and KAF; these companies are then responsible for the handling and security of the equipment until it is loaded onto the commercial flights. For this report, the term "contractor" will include the prime contractor and any subcontractors.



(U) Figure 2. Process Diagram for Pick Up and Shipment of Cargo from BAF and KAF



(U) Source: DoD OIG

## (U) Review of Internal Controls

(U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We determined that the internal controls were not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that DoD ensured contractors were properly securing cargo, including military vehicles and CHs, at BAF and KAF. Specifically, we determined that TRANSCOM contracting officials omitted specific security requirements, did not include effective monitoring and surveillance requirements, and did not appoint any oversight officials in Afghanistan. We will provide a copy of this report to senior officials at TRANSCOM who are responsible for internal controls.

## (U) Finding A

### (U) Improvement Needed in Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Cargo From Kandahar Airfield and Bagram Airfield

(U) TRANSCOM contracting officials did not establish effective security and oversight requirements to safeguard cargo staged for shipment at the APODs in Afghanistan, which allowed contractors to store retrograde cargo in an unsecured and ad hoc manner at BAF and KAF. This occurred because contracting officials:

- (U) omitted specific security requirements from the MM contract;
- (U) did not include effective monitoring and surveillance requirements and methodologies in the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP); and
- (U) did not appoint any oversight officials in Afghanistan.

(U) As a result, DoD has no assurance that contractors are properly securing cargo, including military vehicles and CIIs, at BAF and KAF. As the drawdown of U.S. military equipment accelerates over the next 12 months, thousands of pieces of cargo will be staged at BAF and KAF before departing each APOD. Without stronger contract oversight, there is an increased risk that cargo could be lost, damaged, or vandalized in transit.

### (U) TRANSCOM Did Not Establish Adequate Security Requirements

(U) TRANSCOM contracting officials did not establish within the MM contract adequate security requirements for the safeguarding of retrograde cargo. The MM contract did not include any specific requirements or procedures for the security and safeguarding of the cargo at the APODs, such as the use of perimeter fences, locks, and regular inspections. Instead, the MM contract's Performance Work Statement required contractors "follow their commercial surface and air security and customs procedures to safeguard all cargo against terrorism, theft, loss, tampering, or damage." However, TRANSCOM contracting officials stated that to the "best of our knowledge there is not a uniform commercial procedure." According to TRANSCOM contracting officials, contractors are "held to commercial global best practices in accordance with local laws and customs." However, TRANSCOM officials stated the MM contract did not require contractors to



(U) submit a detailed cargo safeguarding plan to TRANSCOM for review to determine whether contractors had identified and used commercial global best practices to safeguard cargo. As a result, TRANSCOM was unaware of the existence and adequacy of each contractor's cargo safeguarding procedures.

### **(U) Retrograde Cargo Not Properly Secured at Kandahar Airfield and Bagram Airfield**

(U) Contractors at the KAF and BAF APODs did not properly secure cargo in accordance with applicable DoD regulations. Typical cargo stored by contractors at both KAF and BAF APODs includes military vehicles and CIIs. Contractors at the KAF APOD maintain individual storage yards to store equipment overnight (or longer); at the BAF APOD, contractors share a common storage yard on the flight line.<sup>6</sup>

### ***(U) Lack of Adequate Storage Capacity and Security at KAF and BAF***

(U) In April 2013, MM contractors at KAF and BAF did not properly secure 40 military vehicles. Army Regulation 190-51 provides specific guidance on minimum security requirements for Army vehicles and communications and electronic items. For Army vehicles, Army Regulation 190-51 requires, at a minimum, that vehicles be protected by a perimeter fence, with entry and exit points controlled by locks, and be routinely checked for loss, damage, or vandalism. For communications and electronics equipment, this regulation requires, at a minimum, double barrier protection, such as locked or guarded separate building or an enclosed van, trailer, or armored vehicle protected by a perimeter fence.

(U) According to 831<sup>st</sup> officials, the contractors did not store these military vehicles in fenced areas and did not perform routine checks for signs of loss, damage, or vandalism; instead, the contractors parked the vehicles unsecured near the KAF sewage pond and the BAF North Dining Facility, which left the vehicles in a high traffic area and accessible to the entire population at each installation, including U.S. and Coalition military, civilians, contractors, third-country nationals, and local nationals, and vulnerable to loss, damage, or vandalism.

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<sup>6</sup> (U) The five MM contractors use four subcontractors physically located at BAF and KAF to move cargo from the RPAT yard to the flight line. When cargo cannot be flown out on the same day, cargo is picked up from the RPAT yard and stored overnight (or longer) at the subcontractor's storage yard. For this report, when we use the term "contractor," we refer to either the prime contractors—also referred to as "contract carriers"—or their subcontractors.

*(U) KAF Storage Yards*

(U) According to 401st officials, in April 2013, one MM contractor at KAF parked 10 military vehicles unsecured around the sewage pond for at least 1 week (Figure 3). This occurred because the contractor's storage yard was full. According to 831st officials, in April 2013, the KAF flight line was closed for repairs; consequently, no commercial flights were allowed to cargo, which resulted in a backup of equipment at the contractor's storage yard.

*(U) Figure 3. 10 Military Vehicles Parked Unsecured Around the KAF Sewage Pond*



(U) Source: SDDC

(U) On KAF, the MM contractors used three storage yards to stage cargo overnight while awaiting a scheduled commercial flight. On June 16, 2013, we visited the storage yards at KAF. Neither the contractors nor the 831st knew the specific cargo storage capacity of each yard (the maximum number of military vehicles or pallets that could be stored). This information is critical to allow SDDC and the MM contractors to plan for projected future retrograde cargo levels. As the volume of cargo increases over the next 12 months, 831st officials stated the MM contractors' storage yards may not be able to accommodate the additional cargo, increasing the risk contractors will stage more vehicles outside the storage yards in an unsecure manner.

(U) As for the security of the individual contractor storage yards, most had perimeter fences and locks to secure cargo inside. However, we identified many sections of the contractors' fences that were in poor condition, allowing for potential access by unauthorized personnel (Figure 4).



(U) Figure 4. Security Deficiencies with Contractor Storage Yard




~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Source: DoD OIG

(U) In addition, one contractor storage yard, instead of having a chain link fence extending the entire perimeter, used Jersey walls in one section; ~~DoD OIG (b) (2)(F), (b) (7)(F)~~

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (Figure 5). Considering these yards may store CIIs awaiting commercial transport, any deficiencies with the contractors' storage yards present significant security concerns.

(U) Figure 5. Security Deficiencies with Contractor Storage Yards



~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Source: DoD OIG

(U) During our site visit, we discussed with the 831<sup>st</sup> the security deficiencies that we identified and the need for additional storage capacity at KAF. The 831<sup>st</sup> showed us the "UK Yard," a large open yard previously used by the British but now essentially abandoned, as a potential solution to the storage capacity issue. The 831<sup>st</sup> said this yard could be used as an overflow yard when the contractors' yards are full. During our site visit, we observed some scrap vehicles and parts within it; however, if cleaned up, the UK Yard would significantly increase contractor cargo storage capacity. In addition, this yard already had a perimeter fence and a gate in front that can be locked for added security.

### **(U) BAF Storage Area**

(U) In April 2013, one MM contractor at BAF parked 30 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All-Terrain Vehicles unsecured on the side of the road near the North Dining Facility. According to 831<sup>st</sup> officials, this likely occurred because the existing BAF storage area offered insufficient storage capacity for retrograde equipment. Three contractors shared one storage area within the aerial port near the flight line. According to 831<sup>st</sup> officials, SDDC sometimes booked too much cargo for the BAF storage area, causing MM contractors to stage equipment around the airfield.

(U) We visited the BAF storage area on June 28, 2013. Neither the MM contractors nor the 831<sup>st</sup> knew the exact cargo storage capacity of this area. This information is critical to allow SDDC and the MM contractors to plan for anticipated workloads. Furthermore, we observed that this storage area allowed for the temporary storage of cargo not only departing Afghanistan but also entering Afghanistan. Without knowing the exact storage capacity of this area, SDDC could potentially book cargo that exceeds the storage capacity. The storage area did not appear to have the capacity to stage 30 MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles. As a result, in April 2013, 831<sup>st</sup> officials believe that when SDDC booked more cargo than the storage area could maintain, the contractor likely resorted to staging the vehicles throughout BAF.

(U) In addition, we identified a lack of proper segregation and security of cargo within the storage area. For example, all three contractors and their staffs had equal access to the storage area. We observed that the area was not segregated by fences, barriers, or ropes to identify the cargo of each contractor; therefore, it was difficult to determine which contractor was responsible for the cargo staged within this area. Furthermore, although located within the BAF aerial port, the storage area had neither a perimeter fence nor a guard to monitor the cargo. According to one contractor, his company employed 28 personnel who had unfettered access to this area and all the cargo within it.



(U) The contractor also stated that the two other contractors had similar size staffs with the same level of access to this area. Consequently, nearly 90 people, the majority of whom are third-country nationals, had access not only to their cargo but also to the cargo of the other two contractors. We noticed several other individuals—military, civilians, and contractors—also around the storage area.

### ***(U) Cargo Left Vulnerable to Loss, Damage, and Vandalism***

(U) According to the contracting officer representative (COR), contractors not properly securing cargo left it vulnerable to loss, damage, and vandalism. The contractor stated that the 10 military vehicles parked by the sewage pond were “within close proximity” of the contractor and “well within the KAF Base itself.” Consequently, the contractor believed that the vehicles were not left unsecured. However, even though the vehicles were parked close to the contractor’s compound, the contractor did not properly secure them within a fenced perimeter (Figure 6). In addition, according to 401<sup>st</sup> officials at KAF, since the contractors parked the vehicles in a high traffic area, the entire base population, including military, civilian, third-country national, and local nationals, had access to them. Because the vehicles were not locked or in a fenced area, anyone passing by the vehicles could potentially either damage them or throw trash, sundries, and ammunition into them.

*(U) Figure 6. Locations of Contractor’s Compound and MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles*



(U) Source: SDDC

(U) The 401<sup>st</sup> Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB), “Property Accountability, Internal Standard Operating Procedures,” February 22, 2013, requires the search of every military vehicle for ammunition. This process, called “ammo abatement,” requires RPAT personnel perform a rigorous



(U) and thorough inspection check focusing on vehicle hotspots, including exterior, interior, underneath, floor boards, radio mounts, behind/inside seats, and under floor padding, to ensure that the vehicle is free of ammunition.

(U) According to 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB and 831<sup>st</sup> officials, by the time the contractor assumed responsibility for each military vehicle, the 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB had determined the vehicle to be "ammunition free," yet on occasion, military vehicles arrived in Dubai or Baku with loose ammunition inside. For example, in April 2013, 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB officials mentioned 2 specific examples in which 2 military vehicles arrived in Dubai with 41 and 48 rounds of loose ammunition, respectively, after 5 separate checks at the RPAT yard. In addition, at BAF, 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB officials stated multiple vehicles staged near the North Dining Facility had debris, such as used takeout containers and food, inside.

### **(U) Actions Taken Increased the Capacity and Security of Storage Yards**

(U) According to 831<sup>st</sup> officials, the lack of storage yard capacity at KAF and BAF likely resulted in contractor staging equipment in an ad hoc manner throughout both installations. As the volume of cargo increases over the next 12 months, 831<sup>st</sup> officials believe the existing storage yards may not be able to accommodate the additional cargo, increasing the risk of more vehicles being staged outside storage yards in an unsecure manner.

(U) We communicated our storage yard capacity and security concerns to the 831<sup>st</sup> officials at KAF and BAF. Specifically, for KAF, we suggested that the 831<sup>st</sup> determine whether the UK Yard could alleviate future capacity shortfalls. We also suggested that the 831<sup>st</sup> develop a plan to segregate the UK Yard if multiple subcontractors are to use it to avoid the commingling of equipment. Finally, we suggested that the 831<sup>st</sup> perform an assessment of each contractor's existing storage yard fences and replace any sections determined to be in poor condition. For BAF, we suggested that the 831<sup>st</sup> perform an assessment of the security of the existing storage yard, taking the necessary actions to address any shortfalls identified, and confer with the contractors and the BAF Real Property Planning Board to create more secure individual storage areas.

### **(U) Actions Taken at KAF**

(U) The 831<sup>st</sup> agreed with our observations that KAF's existing storage yards provided insufficient capacity and security for retrograde cargo. The 831<sup>st</sup> immediately worked with the Commander of KAF to secure the usage of the UK Yard. The Commander of KAF authorized use of this yard in August 2013. As of September 15, 2013, this yard was cleared, fenced, and available to provide MM contractors with an additional 10 acres of storage capacity. In addition, the 831<sup>st</sup> assessed the



(U) security of the existing storage yards, identified fencing sections in need of repair or replacement, and initiated the replacement of the fence sections.

### ***(U) Actions Taken at BAF***

(U) The 831<sup>st</sup> agreed with our observations that BAF's storage area lacked sufficient capacity and the proper segregation and security of cargo. The 831<sup>st</sup> worked with the BAF Real Property Planning Board to develop requirements to increase cargo storage capacity and security (Figure 7). Specifically, the 831<sup>st</sup> secured a 7.5 acre parcel of land on BAF to be used as a storage yard for the contractors. This new storage yard will include a locked perimeter fence, dedicated lighting, and designated individual contractor areas partitioned off with concrete barriers to avoid commingling of cargo. Each contractor will receive a temporary 1-year use permit from the airfield to use this new yard. In addition, because this new yard is located outside the flight line, this new yard will provide additional security to the MM cargo.

*(U) Figure 7. Location of the New BAF Contractor Storage Area*

DDOIG (b) (7)(F), (b) (7)(G)



(U) Source: 831<sup>st</sup> Transportation Battalion

(U) We commend the 831<sup>st</sup> for significantly increasing the security and storage capacity for MM cargo at BAF and KAF.

### **(U) Contracting Officials Need to Improve Monitoring and Surveillance of Contractors' Security Performance**

(U) TRANSCOM contracting officials did not establish adequate monitoring and surveillance controls of the contractors' security activities. Instead of having documented procedures and dedicated personnel on the ground to monitor each contractor's security activities, TRANSCOM contracting officials created contractor performance metrics that minimized the importance of security and the need for CORs at the APODs. As a result, TRANSCOM contracting officials were unaware of conditions on the ground affecting the security and safeguarding of cargo at the KAF and BAF APODs. Specifically, TRANSCOM contracting officials did not know about the lack of capacity and security concerns with the storage yards and the temporary closing of the KAF flight line, which resulted in multiple contractors parking 40 military vehicles unsecured throughout BAF and KAF.

#### ***(U) TRANSCOM Officials Relied on Two Performance Metrics***

(U) TRANSCOM contracting officials relied on two performance metrics—required delivery date (RDD) and in-transit visibility (ITV)—to evaluate each contractor's performance. According to the MM contract, these two performance metrics accounted for 100 percent of the contractor's rating (75 percent for RDD and 25 percent for ITV). As long as the contractor met the RDD and provided accurate and timely shipment status reports, the contractor received a high performance rating. However, TRANSCOM's Acquisition contracting specialist acknowledged that RDD is not important for retrograde cargo because the cargo is not needed back in the Continental United States at a specific time.

(U) In addition, the MM contract incorporated three additional performance indicators, including whether the cargo arrived in good condition, invoices were submitted timely, and the number of contract discrepancy reports the contractor received. However, none of the five performance metrics and indicators measured or ensured that the contractors properly safeguarded cargo while in their possession.



### ***(U) TRANSCOM Officials Did Not Develop Effective Monitoring and Surveillance Procedures***

(U) TRANSCOM contracting officials did not develop effective monitoring and surveillance procedures to provide adequate oversight of the contractors' cargo safeguarding practices. According to TRANSCOM officials, oversight procedures were "outlined in the contract, QASP, or official COR appointment letter," whereas SDDC Regulation 10-1, "Organization and Functions: Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command," August 1, 2012, delineates specific roles, responsibilities, and functions of SDDC and its subordinate activities. However, neither the MM contract, the QASP, the COR appointment letters, nor SDDC Regulation 10-1 provides specific procedures or roles and responsibilities for the oversight of contractors' cargo safeguarding practices.

#### ***(U) Multi-Modal Contract***

(U) The MM contract's oversight procedures consisted of monitoring and measuring contractor performance with respect to RDD and ITV, not contractor cargo safeguarding operations. The MM contract neither mentioned cargo safeguarding requirements nor established procedures to monitor contractors' security performance.

#### ***(U) Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan***

(U) According to the QASP, the contracting officer and CORs are responsible for ensuring compliance with the terms of the contract, monitoring and reporting on contractor performance, and developing corrective actions when issues are identified. TRANSCOM and SDDC officials created the QASP to provide an effective and systematic method to monitor each contractor's performance to determine compliance with critical standard performance objectives. However, the QASP's critical standard performance objectives mirrored the emphasis of the MM contract's performance work statement: namely, RDD and ITV, not contractor safeguarding of cargo. In addition, the QASP's surveillance methods of contractor activities included a 100-percent inspection of all cargo bookings; however, this requirement pertained to confirming and ensuring the contractor delivered the cargo by the RDD and provided accurate and timely in-transit status reports. TRANSCOM should update and revise the QASP to include the new security and handling requirements.

#### ***(U) Contracting Officer Representative Appointment Letters***

(U) As of December 2013, the TRANSCOM contracting officer had designated seven individuals from the Bahrain-based 595<sup>th</sup> Transportation Brigade to serve as the primary CORs for the MM contract. The COR appointment letter stated that the COR was responsible for monitoring



(U) contractor performance and inspecting and accepting services for the government, and referred the COR to the QASP for contractor “surveillance activities.”

*(U) SDDC Regulation 10-1*

(U) SDDC Regulation 10-1 prescribes the organization, mission, and functions of Headquarters SDDC and its major subordinate activities and units. According to TRANSCOM officials, this regulation outlines the oversight roles, responsibilities, and functions of SDDC with respect to the MM contract and identified the 595<sup>th</sup> with the responsibility to “provide oversight and total asset movement visibility of sustainment shipments . . . throughout the USCENTCOM AOR.” However, the regulation does not include procedures for providing oversight of the MM contract.

(U) The absence of detailed procedures and specific roles and responsibilities by TRANSCOM and SDDC officials resulted in the ineffective oversight of contractors’ cargo-safeguarding practices. The execution of TRANSCOM’s surveillance methods and activities did not recognize that contractors were improperly securing cargo at BAF and KAF APODs. For example, the CORs’ implementation of the QASP did not identify the 40 military vehicles left unsecured, and in plain sight, at both BAF and KAF.

***(U) TRANSCOM Officials Did Not Appoint Oversight Personnel in Afghanistan***

(U) TRANSCOM officials did not officially appoint personnel in Afghanistan to provide oversight of the MM contract. Instead, the contracting officer formally appointed CORs in Bahrain to provide contractor oversight. In addition, contractor oversight consisted of CORs’ tracking contractor computer transactions, such as RDD and ITV, rather than observing contractor operations.

(U) Furthermore, the Bahrain-based CORs, who have not visited Afghanistan since the inception of this contract,<sup>7</sup> relied on the 831<sup>st</sup> Transportation Battalion at BAF and KAF to be the CORs’ “eyes and ears” on the ground. Specifically, the contracting officer and CORs expected the 831<sup>st</sup> to identify contractor noncompliance with MM contract requirements; however, because the contract did not require that the contractors document their cargo safeguarding procedures, the 831<sup>st</sup> did not know whether noncompliance occurred.

(U) According to 831<sup>st</sup> officials, they provided administrative assistance to SDDC for the redeployment of military units and retrograde cargo, including creating lift plans and border crossing memorandums for all cargo. TRANSCOM officials stated that SDDC Regulation 10-1

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<sup>7</sup> (U) According to SDDC, a COR last visited Afghanistan in April 2012.



(U) outlined the roles and responsibilities of SDDC's subordinate battalions, including the 595<sup>th</sup> and 831<sup>st</sup>. However, this regulation established only that the 831<sup>st</sup> is a subordinate command of the 595<sup>th</sup> and had detachment units in Afghanistan. Neither the contracting officer nor SDDC Regulation 10-1 defined the roles and responsibilities of the 831<sup>st</sup> with respect to monitoring contractor cargo safeguarding operations. As a result, 831<sup>st</sup> officials stated they did not know what TRANSCOM expected them to do or report. TRANSCOM should perform a resource analysis to determine the number and location of CORs necessary to perform adequate contract surveillance of the MM contract in Afghanistan and appoint additional CORs as necessary.

### ***(U) TRANSCOM Officials Not Aware of Conditions on the Ground in Afghanistan***

(U) The contracting officer and CORs were unaware of conditions on the ground at BAF and KAF. The CORs expected the 831<sup>st</sup> to "report events/occurrences that may impact movement of cargo." However, the contracting officer and CORs did not adequately convey these additional duties to the 831<sup>st</sup>. As a result, the 831<sup>st</sup> did not report specific events that impacted cargo movement. For example, in April 2013, the KAF flight line closed for 2 weeks for repairs. The 831<sup>st</sup> did not report this closing to the contracting officer and CORs. Consequently, SDDC continued to book cargo, the contractor's storage yard filled up, and the contractor resorted to parking military vehicles near the sewage pond.

(U) In addition, multiple contractors parked at least 40 military vehicles unsecured at BAF and KAF; however, the 831<sup>st</sup> did not report this to the CORs to resolve the issue. Instead, the 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB identified that MM contractors left military vehicles in an unsecure manner, photographed each vehicle (with serial number), and reported the matter to the CORs to resolve. The 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB officials advised the CORs that the contractors parked military vehicles throughout KAF on a daily basis. According to TRANSCOM officials, this incident "indicates SDDC was aware and took proper action." However, SDDC became aware only after the 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB, a military unit outside the TRANSCOM chain of command, identified the problem and reported it to the CORs.

(U) Furthermore, the MM contract required the contractors provide detailed information of all storage yard locations used to store cargo before shipment. The five MM contractors provided TRANSCOM with either the latitude and longitude or storage capacity of 28 storage yards located throughout Afghanistan; however, when we asked which specific storage yards are physically located on BAF and KAF, TRANSCOM responded with the following: "Per the MM contract, carriers are only responsible to provide the Longitude and Latitude coordinates of their respective carrier storage yards. We have no additional location information." Finally, TRANSCOM and SDDC officials were unaware of the contractor storage yard security deficiencies. TRANSCOM should

(U) modify the multi-modal contract to define the security and handling requirements of the contractors necessary to properly protect equipment. Additionally, SDDC should create and implement Standard Operating Procedures to establish a methodology for monitoring and validating that contractors (and their subcontractors) are properly securing and handling equipment.

## **(U) Increased Risk That Cargo Is Not Secured in Transit**

(U) The lack of security requirements, oversight procedures, and knowledge of conditions on the ground in Afghanistan increased the risk that cargo is not secured while at BAF and KAF. As a result, contractor security performance left cargo vulnerable to loss, damage, or vandalism. For example, contractors at BAF and KAF left military vehicles unsecured in high traffic areas, which exposed them to the entire population at each installation. According to 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB officials, several military vehicles that left the RPAT yard “clean” had ammunition and trash found inside when they arrived at Dubai and Baku.

## **(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### **(U) Recommendation A.1**

(U) We recommend the U.S. Transportation Command contracting officer:

- a. **(U) Modify the multi-modal contract to define the security and handling requirements of the contractors necessary to properly protect cargo.**

### **(U) U.S. Transportation Command Comments**

(U) The Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command disagreed with the recommendation. He stated that a modification to existing contract language is not required because the current language within the multi-modal contract adequately mitigated the risk of loss or damage to cargo. Specifically, the contract requires that the multi-modal contractor use commercial practices for security of cargo and includes liability language to discourage cargo from being stored in a manner that will result in it being lost or damaged. The Deputy Commander stated that the contracting officer will send a letter to the multi-modal contractors reminding them of the importance of safeguarding cargo. In addition, the Deputy Commander mentioned that there have been no instances where cargo has been lost or damaged based solely on the manner in which the contractor stored the cargo in Afghanistan.



***(U) Our Response***

(U) The response from the Deputy Commander partially addressed the recommendation. Sending a letter to the multi-modal contractors reminding them of the importance of safeguarding cargo is a positive step, however, relying on this letter and existing contract language does not fully meet the intent of our recommendation to modify the contract to define unique security requirements for Afghanistan to augment standard commercial practices. Although the existing contract language requires the contractor to use commercial best practices for security of cargo, U.S. Transportation Command officials were unaware of the existence and adequacy of each multi-modal contractor's cargo safeguarding procedures.

(U) In addition, the Deputy Commander mentioned that there have been no instances where cargo was lost or damaged because of contractor safeguarding practices, however, we identified several instances where cargo was left unsecured and vulnerable to theft and vandalism. This report documented examples of military vehicles determined to be ammunition-free by the 401st AFSB arriving in Dubai or Baku with loose ammunition inside. The 401st AFSB also documented examples where military vehicles were staged in unsecure location near the North Dining Facility and had debris inside. Therefore, we request the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, provide additional comments to the recommendation by May 5, 2014.

- b. (U) Update and revise the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan to include the new security and handling requirements.**

***(U) U.S. Transportation Command Comments***

(U) The Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command agreed with recommendation stating that the command will modify the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan to include procedures for the Contracting Officer Representatives to monitor contractor safeguarding of cargo.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) The response from the Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, addressed all of the specifics of the recommendation. No further comments are required.

- c. (U) Perform a resource analysis to determine the number and location of Contracting Officer Representatives that the U.S. Transportation Command will need to perform adequate contract surveillance in Afghanistan and appoint additional Contracting Officer Representatives as needed.**

***(U) U.S. Transportation Command Comments***

(U) The Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command agreed with the recommendation, stating that the command believes that its current number and location of Contracting Officer Representatives in Afghanistan is adequate; however, U.S. Transportation Command will perform a resource analysis to determine if additional Contracting Officer Representatives are required.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) The response from the Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, addressed all of the specifics of the recommendation. No further comments are required.

***(U) Recommendation A.2***

(U) We recommend the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Global Contract Compliance Branch Chief create and implement Standard Operating Procedures to establish the methodology for monitoring and validating that contractors (and their subcontractors) are properly securing and handling cargo.

***(U) U.S. Transportation Command Comments***

(U) The Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command agreed with the recommendation stating the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command will implement Standard Operating Procedures to establish the methodology to monitor and validate contractor security and handling practices.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) The response from the Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, addressed all of the specifics of the recommendation. No further comments are required.



## **(U) Finding B**

### **(U) The Kandahar Airfield and Bagram Airfield Aerial Ports Improved the Physical Security and Storing of Sensitive Cargo**

(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)]

(U) As the drawdown of U.S. military personnel and equipment accelerates over the next 12 months, billions of dollars of sensitive equipment will transition through the BAF and KAF aerial ports. As a result of the security and storage issues identified at each aerial port, highly sensitive cargo, including weapons systems, intelligence material, and communications equipment, is at risk of being lost, damaged, or falling into the hands of our enemies to be used against our coalition partners or us.

### **(U) Aerial Port Personnel Did Not Store Sensitive Cargo in Adequate Security Cages**

(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)]

### **(U) Weaknesses With the KAF Outdoor Storage Cage and the BAF Indoor and Outdoor Storage Cages**

(U) Various DoD and Air Force regulations establish minimum security, storage, and handling requirements for the protection of sensitive cargo. DoDM 5100.76, "Physical Security of Sensitive

(U) Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)," April 17, 2012, provides guidelines for security storage areas protecting, among other things, ammunition and explosives. DoDM 5200.01, volume 3, "DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information," March 19, 2013, provides guidance for safeguarding, storage, destruction, transmission, and transportation of classified material. Air Mobility Command Instruction (AMCI) 24-101, volume 11, "Transportation Cargo and Mail Policy," April 11, 2013, and Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R-Part II, "Air Commodity and Air Special Handling Codes," September 19, 2011, identify the security requirements for sensitive cargo requiring "constant surveillance."

*(U) KAF Outdoor Storage Cage*

(U) During two separate walkthroughs of the KAF outdoor storage cage on June 16 and 17, 2013, we observed specific instances where the storage cage did not comply with applicable DoD regulations, resulting in significant security weaknesses. For example, DoDM 5100.76 requires perimeter fencing, at a minimum, consist of a chain link fence at least 6 feet high excluding top guard/outrigger, with the bottom of the fence extending 2 inches into the ground. We observed the following:

- (C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [REDACTED] (TRANSCOM (b)(1), sec. 1.4(d))  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (Figure 8 left);
- (C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [REDACTED] (TRANSCOM (b)(1), sec. 1.4(a))  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [REDACTED] (TRANSCOM (b)(1), sec. 1.4(a))  
[REDACTED] (Figure 8 right);
- (C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [REDACTED] (TRANSCOM (b)(1), sec. 1.4(a))  
[REDACTED]
- (C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [REDACTED] (TRANSCOM (b)(1), sec. 1.4(a))  
[REDACTED]



~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Figure 8.

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Sources: DoD OIG

~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

*(U) BAF Indoor Storage Cage*

(U) At the BAF aerial port, the indoor storage cage was constructed by adding two chain link fence sections to the corner inside of an existing building used for the delivery, pickup, and storage of cargo. During a walkthrough of the BAF indoor storage cage on July 12, 2013, we observed the following significant weaknesses:

- ~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED] (Figure 9);
- ~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]
- ~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]
- ~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]
- ~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]
- ~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]

*(U) Figure 9. Deficiencies with BAF's Inside Storage Cage*



~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Source: DoD OIG



*(U) BAF Outdoor Storage Cage*

~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)



(Figure 10).

*(U) Figure 10. The Fence Separating the General Cargo Area (left) From the Outdoor Storage Cage (right).*

DoD OIG (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)



TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Source: DoD OIG

~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)



~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)



## (U) Aerial Port Personnel at Kandahar Airfield Could Improve the Accountability and Storing of Sensitive Cargo

(U) During our walkthrough of the KAF aerial port on June 16, 2013, we identified weaknesses over the accounting and storing of sensitive cargo that, if left unresolved, could result in the damage or loss to this equipment. For example, we observed four GSA tri-wall containers in the Unit Line Number cargo holding area (Figure 11). When we inquired about these containers, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel stated the containers had been in the holding area for over 1 year and were thought to contain cargo nets.

(U) Figure 11. The Location and Condition of the Four GSA Tri-Wall Containers



(U) Source: DoD OIG

(U) At our request, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS emptied each container of its contents. We inventoried the contents, which appeared to be sensitive communications equipment from multiple MRAPs, and determined a minimum value of more than \$300,000 (Figure 12). In addition, the containers lacked documentation to identify their origin, date received, itemized listing of contents, or final destination.



(U) Figure 12. Examples of Sensitive Communications Equipment Not Properly Accounted for or Secured by KAF Aerial Port Personnel



(U) Source: DoD OIG

(U) We also observed a container of medical equipment, worth more than \$90,000, marked "Medical Equipment Heat Sensitive" in an outside cargo storage cage exposed to direct sunlight and temperatures approaching nearly 100 degrees Fahrenheit (Figure 13).

(U) Figure 13. Heat-Sensitive Medical Equipment in Outdoor Storage Cage



(U) Source: DoD OIG

(U) According to 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel, this equipment was scheduled for recalibration in Qatar; however, placing heat-sensitive equipment exposed to extreme temperatures left it susceptible to damage.

## (U) Controls for Handling and Securing Cargo Could Be Improved

(C//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) [REDACTED] TRANSOM (b) (1), sec. 1-3(a)

### (U) KAF Aerial Port

(U) According to 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel, they were unaware of the specific DoD and Air Force regulations that establish the minimum security and storage requirements for the protection of sensitive cargo. However, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel stated that the current deployed environment does not allow for "home station amenities" (the same level of security). In addition, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel stated that the aerial port itself provided an added layer of security to the outdoor security cage. Namely, the outdoor security cage is located within the aerial port perimeter fence. However, within the aerial port perimeter fence are U.S. and Coalition military, contractors, and local nationals and third-country nationals with varying degrees of access to the aerial port and the multiple cargo holding areas.

(U) With regard to the constant surveillance requirement, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel stated that the outdoor storage cage is located in a highly lit, 24/7 (24 hours per day, 7 days per week) manned area. Although 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel are on duty 24 hours per day, their office buildings do not provide a direct view of the outdoor storage cage. Furthermore, during our two walkthroughs, we did not observe any personnel dedicated to guarding the cargo within the outdoor storage cage. The 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS stated they perform an inventory of all outdoor storage cage cargo [REDACTED] DoD OIG (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F).

[REDACTED]. If sensitive cargo is lost or stolen from the outdoor storage cage, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS could take up to [REDACTED] DoD OIG (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) to realize it.

(U) In addition, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel stated that redeploying units often misclassify the special handling requirements for their cargo. For example, DD form 1387-2, "Special Handling Data/Certification," accompanied all sensitive cargo requiring special handling by aerial port personnel. However, a 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS official stated that redeploying units simply "cut and paste" the "constant surveillance" words as a default on the shipment package when the individual cargo pieces did not require that level of oversight. However, the redeploying unit, not the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS, determines the level of oversight required for individual pieces of cargo. Furthermore, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS left the medical cargo outside in direct sunlight because the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS did not think the



(U) medical cargo was heat-sensitive even though the container was clearly marked "Medical Equipment Heat Sensitive."

(U) Finally, AMCI 24-101, volume 11, requires a physical inventory to reconcile all cargo on hand at the aerial port. When we inquired about the four GSA containers observed during our walkthrough, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel stated the containers had been in the cargo area for over 1 year. The previous unit passed on incorrect information that the containers held cargo nets, not communications equipment; therefore, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS did not inventory the contents or secure the containers, which left the contents, worth more than \$300,000, vulnerable to loss, damage, or vandalism.


**(U) BAF Aerial Port**

(C// REL TO USA, ICAF, NATO)

TRANSCOM (b) (1) sec. 1.4(b)

[REDACTED]

(U) Figure 14. A Section of the BAF Aerial Port Perimeter Fence in Need of Repair



(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Source: DoD OIG

(U) According to 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS personnel, the existing indoor and outdoor storage cages, which were constructed in 2011, provide a substantial security upgrade compared to where sensitive cargo was previously stored. For example, before 2010, the 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS stored sensitive cargo in B-huts and DRASH<sup>8</sup> tents. Although the current, semi-secured indoor and outdoor security cages represent a significant improvement over tents, the security deficiencies we observed limit the security cages' overall effectiveness and require immediate attention.

### (U) Increased Risk of Cargo Loss, Damage, or Misuse

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.3(a)  
[Redacted text block]

(U) As the drawdown of U.S. military personnel and equipment accelerates over the next 12 months, billions of dollars of sensitive equipment, including weapons systems, intelligence material, and communications equipment, will be handled and stored at the KAF and BAF aerial

<sup>8</sup> (U) DRASH tents are Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelters.



(U) ports on its way back to its final destination. Corrective actions need to be taken to reduce the risk this highly sensitive cargo is lost, damaged, or falls into the hands of our enemies.

### **(U) Actions Taken Improved the Security of Sensitive Cargo Stored at the Kandahar Airfield Aerial Port**

(U) On July 8, 2013, considering the sensitivity of cargo stored within the KAF outdoor storage cage, we communicated our security concerns to the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS, suggesting that the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS confer with a security official within the 451<sup>st</sup> Air Expeditionary Wing to develop long- and short-term solutions. Specifically, we suggested developing a long-term solution including designing, funding, and constructing a security cage that provides the required amount of protection and deterrence, while in the meantime taking immediate action to provide additional security measures to the existing outdoor security cage until the long-term solution could be implemented.

(U) The 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS agreed with our observations that the outdoor storage cage provided inadequate security and deterrence. The day after we initially conveyed our concerns to the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS, June 18, 2013, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS submitted a work order to fund and construct a permanent fenced structure to replace the existing outdoor storage cage (Figure 15). This fenced structure, which will be TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a) higher than the minimum height required by DoDM 5100.76), eliminates the security deficiencies of the existing outdoor storage cage and includes a continuous chain link fence, [REDACTED] The KAF wing level review board approved this project on July 19, 2013, and construction was completed on December 10, 2013.


(U) Figure 15. Designs for the New KAF Outdoor Storage Cage



(U) Source: 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS

(U) In the meantime, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel quickly made corrective actions to the existing outdoor storage cage. For example, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS added a 96-inch sniper screen to prevent outside visual of the equipment within the outside storage cage and DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) to the bottom of the fence, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) (Figure 16 left), replaced the DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) (Figure 16 right), DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) The actions taken by the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS significantly improved the overall security of existing outdoor storage cage.

(U) Figure 16. Corrective Actions Taken To Improve Security to the Existing Outdoor Storage Cage. On Left, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)



(U) Sources: 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS



(U//FOUO) With regard to the constant surveillance requirement, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS recently [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F). As a result, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS dedicated personnel to provide continuous (24 hours per day, 7 days per week) monitoring of all equipment requiring constant surveillance.

(U) Finally, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel acknowledged the handling and storage deficiencies that we identified during our walkthrough and took immediate actions to correct them. Specifically, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel inventoried and secured the sensitive communications cargo inside the four tri-wall containers and then turned the equipment into the KAF Redistribution Property Assistance Team and Retrograde Sort Yard for appropriate handling. As for the heat-sensitive medical cargo in the outside security cage, after we pointed out that the heat-sensitive medical cargo had been stored in direct sunlight, 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS personnel moved the heat-sensitive medical cargo to a more appropriate storage area. In addition, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS ordered a refrigeration unit to provide a temperature-controlled container to properly store sensitive medical cargo and products in the future.

(U) The immediate and long-term corrective actions instituted by the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS resolved the issues that we had identified. As a result, the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS significantly increased the level of security and handling of sensitive cargo. We commend the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS's efforts to immediately resolve the issues that we had identified.

**(U) Actions Initiated Will Significantly Improve the Security of Sensitive Cargo at the Bagram Airfield Aerial Port**

(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) TRANSCONT (b) (1), see 1.4(a)

(U) The 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS agreed with our observations that the indoor and outdoor storage cages provided inadequate security and deterrence and took immediate actions to correct our concerns. For example, the 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS:

- (C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [TRANSCONT (0101556 1-14)]

- (U//~~FOUO~~) installed ~~DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)~~ of the indoor and outdoor storage cages (Figure 17);
- (~~C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) ~~TRANSOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~
- (U) required all individuals entering the indoor and outdoor storage cages sign in/out via Standard Form 702.

(U) Figure 17. ~~DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)~~ Added to the BAF Indoor Storage Cage



(U//~~FOUO~~) Source: 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS

(~~C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) ~~TRANSOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~

(Figure 18).



(U) Figure 18. The BAF Aerial Port Perimeter Fence, Including Plans To Replace Several Sections of Fence Determined To Be in Poor Condition



(U//~~FOUO~~) Source: 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS

(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)



(U) We determined that the corrective actions planned and taken by the 455<sup>th</sup> significantly improve the security of sensitive cargo within the indoor and outdoor security cages. Once all planned corrective actions are instituted, the 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS will properly safeguard and monitor sensitive cargo. We commend the 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS's efforts to immediately resolve the issues that we had identified.

## (U) Summary

(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)



(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) [REDACTED] TRANSCOM (b)(1), sec. 14(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Considering the sensitivity of cargo stored at the KAF and BAF aerial ports, we not only communicated our security concerns but also suggested potential resolutions to the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS and 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS. Each squadron immediately acted on our suggestions and resolved the security concerns.



## **(U) Finding C**

### **(U) Improperly Packaged Cargo—Management Actions Addressed Concerns Identified**

(U) Closing forward operating bases (FOBs) were not properly packing redeploying unit cargo prior to its arrival at BAF aerial port for transport to the Continental United States. This occurred because the FOBs lack experienced personnel with knowledge of the cargo process and Air Mobility Command standards. Improperly packaged cargo cannot be positioned for onward movement; instead, the 455th EAPS must physically relocate this cargo to a separate area of the APOD to address and resolve any deficiencies. As the drawdown of FOBs accelerates over the next 12 months, the amount of redeploying unit cargo arriving at BAF will significantly increase. As a result, the efficiency of BAF's aerial port operation will be negatively impacted and redeploying unit cargo will be exposed to loss, damage, or vandalism.

### **(U) Closing Forward Operating Bases Were Not Properly Packing Redeploying Unit Cargo**

(U) Closing FOBs were not properly packing redeploying unit cargo prior to its arrival at BAF. The majority of redeploying military units' cargo from FOBs, including sensitive equipment, pass through the BAF aerial port, an air transportation hub for Afghanistan, on its way back to the Continental United States. BAF aerial port personnel, the 455th EAPS, are responsible for ensuring that all cargo meets Air Mobility Command's airworthiness and U.S. Agricultural/Customs requirements prior to placement on aircraft for onward movement. AMCI 24-101, volume 11, categorizes cargo not meeting these requirements (and therefore unable to be accepted into the airlift system) as frustrated. Deficiencies that caused redeploying units' cargo to be frustrated include poorly palletized crates (cargo not built correctly), hazardous material issues (for example, pieces of equipment leaking oil), deficient or lacking necessary customs documentation, and dirty crates and loose nets and straps. According to 455th EAPS officials, as of May 2013, they received on average approximately 150 pallets of cargo each month requiring corrective actions.

### **(U) Forward Operating Bases Lack Experienced Personnel**

(U) According to a Cargo Processing Branch official, about 98 percent of the improperly packaged cargo arrives from the FOBs because the FOBs lack experienced personnel with knowledge of the cargo process and Air Mobility Command standards. For example, Air Transportation personnel do

(U) not manage all FOBs. As a result, the inexperienced personnel at the FOBs are not enforcing the Air Mobility Command airworthiness standards and requirements, such as cleanliness, proper documentation (for example, customs, hazardous material, etc.), and correctly built cargo.

### ***(U) BAF Aerial Port Personnel Created a Dedicated Unit To Resolve Cargo Deficiencies***

(U) In February 2013, the 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS created the Cargo Processing Branch and assigned six military personnel to perform cargo inspections and correct cargo packaging deficiencies. Generally, correcting the deficiencies required completely rebuilding the entire pallet to meet airworthiness, agriculture, and customs requirements; pressure-washing dirty equipment and containers; or fixing loose nets and straps. Once the deficiencies were corrected, the cargo was positioned for onward movement to its final destination. According to Cargo Processing Branch personnel, the majority of their time was spent fixing cargo packaging deficiencies.

### ***(U) Improperly Packaged Cargo***

(U) On June 3, 2013, Cargo Processing Branch personnel took us on a tour of the aerial port's general cargo bay area where newly arrived in-transit cargo awaited inspection. During our walkthrough, Cargo Processing Branch personnel estimated at least 90 percent of the cargo needed to be corrected for following reasons (Figure 19):

- (U) cargo in wooden boxes were partially sealed, with exposed nails and rotting wood;
- (U) equipment parts with leaking oil on the floor of the pallet;
- (U) loose cargo nets, chains, and straps used to tie down equipment;
- (U) mud caked on the cargo; and
- (U) missing customs and hazardous material documentation.



(U) Figure 19. Examples of Cargo Arriving at BAF



(U) Source: DoD OIG

(U) In addition, during our walkthrough, Cargo Processing Branch personnel identified damaged cargo that had resulted from poor packaging techniques. We observed cargo with potential water damage and cargo that appeared to be crushed.

(U) The 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS personnel moved all improperly packaged cargo to a separate area to correct the deficiencies. However, until the improperly packed pallets are rebuilt, this cargo is vulnerable to loss, damage, or vandalism.

(U) As of May 2013, the Cargo Processing Branch had sufficient staff to correct the majority of the cargo packaging deficiencies within 72 hours; however, some cargo with unique circumstances takes staff more than 72 hours to correct deficiencies. As the drawdown of U.S. Forces accelerates over the next 12 months, the volume of improperly packaged cargo is expected to significantly increase as more units at closing FOBs redeploy their cargo. This anticipated increase in cargo packaging deficiencies will potentially overwhelm the Cargo Processing Branch staff, create a backlog of deficient cargo, and drastically reduce the efficiency of the aerial port's cargo movement function.

## (U) Actions Taken Improved Cargo Handling at Bagram Airfield

(S//NF) TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]

(S) TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]

---

<sup>9</sup> (U//FOUO) CENTCOM established the CMRE to assist with the execution of the retrograde of materiel, redeployment of unit cargo, and to support base closures/transfers.



(U) Figure 20. Example of Properly Palletized Cargo from FOBs with CMRE Personnel



(U) Source: 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS

### (U) Summary

~~(S//NF)~~

TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

(S//NF) TRANSCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

## (U) Appendix A

### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 through February 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) This is one in a series of audits regarding TRANSCOM's support of the Afghanistan drawdown. We reviewed DoD, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, Army and Air Force regulations to determine the specific criteria for the security and handling of cargo (both sensitive and nonsensitive). Specifically, we reviewed the Defense Transportation Regulation, DoD Instructions, and applicable Army and Air Force guidance.

(U) Due to travel and security constraints, we limited our review to the BAF and KAF APODs. We also considered all equipment and material redeploying through the APODs.

(U) We coordinated with or interviewed military and civilian officials from:

- (U) CENTCOM;
- (U) TRANSCOM;
- (U) SDDC;
- (U) U.S. Forces-Afghanistan;
- (U) 451st ELRS;
- (U) 455th EAPS;
- (U) 401st AFSB;
- (U) 831st Transportation Battalion; and
- (U) MM contractors.



(U) We conducted site visits to the BAF and KAF APODs and observed both the Air Force and Army processes to determine whether procedures were in place to effectively process equipment. First, we obtained documentation from the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS, 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS, and 831<sup>st</sup> to identify the specific pieces of equipment staged at the APODs. Then, during our site visits, we reviewed the procedures for securing sensitive equipment to ensure that the 451<sup>st</sup> ELRS, 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS, and MM contractors safeguarded equipment in accordance with applicable DoD, Air Force, and Army regulations. In addition, we inspected the indoor and outdoor security cages and contractor storage yards to determine whether they provided adequate security for sensitive equipment. We also observed the 831<sup>st</sup>'s procedures for monitoring contractor staging of cargo. Finally, we monitored the 455<sup>th</sup> EAPS's procedures for handling improperly packaged cargo.

### (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(S//NF) TRANSCOM (b) (1)-sec. 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]

### (U) Use of Technical Assistance

(U) We did not use technical assistance while conducting this audit.

## (U) Appendix B

### (U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), Army Audit Agency, and Air Force Audit Agency issued 15 reports dealing with the drawdown of equipment from Afghanistan or topics related to the management of aerial port operations. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil and gao.gov domains over the Internet at <http://www.aaa.army.mil>. Unrestricted Air Force Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil domains over the Internet at <https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=OO-AD-01-41>.

### (U) GAO

(U) GAO-13-218SP, "Afghanistan – Key Oversight Issues," February 11, 2013

(U) GAO-13-185R, "Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DoD Decision Makers Need Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess Equipment," December 19, 2012

(U) GAO-11-774, "Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role," September 16, 2011

(U) GAO-10-179, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq," November 2, 2009

### (U) DoD IG

(U) DoDIG-2013-066, "Transportation Planning is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations; However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems," April 12, 2013 (Classified)

(U) DoDIG-2012-071, "DoD's Management of the Redistribution Property Assistance Team in Kuwait," April 10, 2012

(U) D-2011-056, "Consistent Use of Supply Support Activities Could Increase Efficiency of Equipment Drawdown from Iraq," April 14, 2011



(U) D-2010-091, "DoD Needs to Improve Management and Oversight of Operations at the Theater Retrograde – Camp Arifjan, Kuwait," September 30, 2010

(U) D-2010-088, "Accountability and Disposition of Government Furnished Property in Conjunction with Iraq Drawdown – Logistics Civil Augmentation Program," September 30, 2010

(U) D-2010-060, "Drawdown and Reset of Equipment in Iraq – Operation Clean Sweep," June 11, 2010

### **(U) Army**

(U) A-2012-0160-MTE, "Property Accountability Over Unit Equipment Shipped to Afghanistan," August 21, 2012

### **(U) Air Force**

(U) F2013-0017-RA0000 "Aerial Port Operations 451<sup>st</sup> Air Expeditionary Wing Kandahar Air Base Afghanistan," February 20, 2013

(U) F2013-0010-RA0000, "Aerial Port Operations 455<sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Wing Bagram Air Field Afghanistan," February 5, 2013

(U) F2013-0009-RA0000, "Shipment of Controlled Items 455<sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Wing Bagram Air Field Afghanistan," January 29, 2013

(U) F2008-0008-FD3000, "United States Air Forces Central Deployed Locations Aerial Port Operations," July 18, 2008

## Management Comments

### (U) U.S. Transportation Command



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**  
4000 W. BRIDGE DRIVE  
FORT BELLEVILLE, ILLINOIS 62205-5000

7 March 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR

GENERAL FROM: TCDC

SUBJECT: (U) U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan  
DODIG, Draft Report (Project No. D2013-DOOJB-0149.000)  
(Document is classified ~~SECRET~~)

(U) 1. The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) staff has reviewed the subject report and nonconcur with recommendation A.1.a and concurs with comments to recommendations A.1.b., A.1.c, and A.2 contained in the attachment.

(U) 2. For additional information or assistance, please contact [REDACTED]

WILLIAM A. BROWN  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Deputy Commander

2 Attachments:

- (U) 1. USTRANSCOM response
- (U) 2. DODIG Draft Report (Document is classified ~~SECRET~~)

cc:  
TCAQ  
TCJA  
SDDC

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
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**(U) U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)**

**DODIG, Draft Report (Project No. D2013-D000JB-0149.000)**

(U) "U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan"

(U) **Recommendations A. 1.** We recommend the U.S. Transportation Command contracting officer:

(U) (a) **Modify the multi-modal contract to define the security and handling requirements of the contractors necessary to properly protect cargo.**

**USTRANSCOM Response:** Nonconcur with comments.

(U) The Government has adequately mitigated the risk of loss or damage to the cargo by requiring the Multimodal contractors to use the same customary commercial practices for security as in place with the contractor's commercial customers. These best commercial practices have resulted in no losses or damage to cargo while stored in Afghanistan. By containing the appropriate liability language in the contract, adequate incentive exists to discourage cargo from being stored in a manner that will result in it being lost and/or damaged.

(U) The Contracting Officer will send a letter to the five Multimodal contractors emphasizing the importance of complying with paragraph 1.7.1 of the PWS. More specifically, the contractors will be reminded about the importance of safeguarding all cargo against terrorism, theft, loss, tampering or damage. In addition, the contractors will be reminded that paragraph 4.1.1 requires the contractor to deliver cargo to the final destination in the same condition as tendered by the shipper or else they are liable for any loss or damage.

(U) The cargo liability language in the Multimodal contract places the responsibility for any loss or damage to cargo while in possession of the contractor on the contractor which adequately mitigates the risk of loss or damage. This further incentivizes the contractor to use commercial best practices to avoid cargo loss or damage. Therefore, no modification to the contract language is required as there have been no instances where cargo has been lost or damaged based solely on the manner in which it was stored in Afghanistan.


(U) (b) **Update and revise the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan to include the new security and handling requirements.**

(U) **USTRANSCOM Response:** Concur with comments.

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**This page and Tab 1 are UNCLASSIFIED when Tab 2 is removed**

**(U) U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)**





## (U) Annex

### (U) List of Classified Sources

1. (~~S//NF~~) Title: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20380716
2. (~~S//NF~~) Title: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20380827
3. (~~S//NF~~) Title: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20380827
4. (~~S//NF~~) ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~  
  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20380821
5. (~~S//NF~~) ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20380915
6. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~  
  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20380830
7. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) Title: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~  
  
  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20380924

8. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 20381002

9. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 20381002

10. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 20380802

11. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a)~~

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 20380814

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Derived From: Multiple Sources



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## **(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<b>(U) AMCI</b>	Air Mobility Command Instruction
<b>(U) APOD</b>	Aerial Port of Debarkation
<b>(U) BAF</b>	Bagram Airfield
<b>(U) CENTCOM</b>	U.S. Central Command
<b>(U) CII</b>	Controlled Inventory Item
<b>(U) CMRE</b>	CENTCOM Materiel Recovery Element
<b>(U) COR</b>	Contracting Officer Representative
<b>(U) EAPS</b>	Expeditionary Aerial Port Squadron
<b>(U) ELRS</b>	Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron
<b>(U) FOB</b>	Forward Operating Base
<b>(U) ITV</b>	In-Transit Visibility
<b>(U) KAF</b>	Kandahar Airfield
<b>(U) MM</b>	Multi-Modal
<b>(U) MRAP</b>	Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected
<b>(U) QASP</b>	Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan
<b>(U) RDD</b>	Required Delivery Date
<b>(U) DDC</b>	Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
<b>(U) TRANSCOM</b>	U.S. Transportation Command

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